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International organizations like the World 
Bank and the OECD, and aid donors like 
Australia, are increasingly concerned about 
corruption in developing countries.  They 
may require action against corruption as a 
condition of membership, or as a condition for 
funding. The international interest in preventing 
corruption has been stimulated and guided by 
the influential non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), Transparency International (TI). It was 
founded in 1993 by disaffected international 
civil servants, frustrated at the World Bank’s 
tolerance of corruption in aid projects, and angry 
at the way Western governments tolerated their 
own companies’ bribery of foreign officials 
(Larmour 2006).
It is now over a decade since these new 
international interventions against corruption 
began. Nobody commends corruption, but a 
small critical literature on the anti-corruption 
movement is emerging, particularly from 
Eastern Europe where scholars have found 
externally-sponsored anti-corruption campaigns 
encouraging a populist style of politics that could 
undermine the legitimacy of newly established 
democracies (Kotkin and Sajo 2002, Tisne and 
Smilov 2004).  Bryane Michael has assessed 
anti-corruption campaigns in Africa, finding 
a standard model that paid little attention 
to variable local conditions (2004a, 2004b, 
2004c).
As these examples suggest, anti-corruption 
campaigns can be evaluated against different, 
potentially conflicting, criteria. The standard 
criteria in the study of public administration 
have been the several ‘e’s: economy; efficiency; 
effectiveness and equity.  The first looks at 
costs, and asks if the policy was implemented 
cheaply or without waste. It is a traditional 
concern of public accounts committees and 
taxpayers’ associations. The second - typically 
the concern of economists - looks at the 
relationship between inputs and outputs. It asks 
if the most was achieved from the resources 
committed to a project (so-called technical or 
‘X’ efficiency) or if the resources might have 
been better used elsewhere (so called allocative 
or social efficiency). For example, the police 
may conduct a technically efficient campaign 
against corruption, but could their time have 
been more usefully spent dealing with other 
kinds of crime?  These allocative questions are 
often asked in budget negotiations. 
The third, effectiveness, will be the main 
focus of this paper. It looks at the impact or 
effects of a policy, and asks if it achieved what 
the contribution 
of ausaid to 
this series is 
acknowledged 
with appreciation. 
discussion  
paper 2007/1
state, society and governance in melanesia
the australian national universitY
research school of pacific and asian studies
state society and
governance inmelanesia
discussion paper
  evaluating international action against corruption in the pacific islands
2
it set out to do.  Did it, for example, actually 
reduce corruption? The fourth criterion looks 
at the justice or fairness of policy, either 
in its processes or outcomes. For example, 
did the anti-corruption campaign trample on 
human rights to achieve its goals (a matter of 
process)? Did the campaign only punish the 
‘little fish’ leaving the ‘big fish’ unharmed (a 
matter of outcomes)? Campaigns for ‘good 
governance’ introduce additional criteria for 
policy evaluation, such as transparency and 
accountability.  
Any anti-corruption campaign is, of course, 
hard to assess. There are disagreements on 
what exactly counts as corruption (discussed 
further below) and popular perceptions may 
underestimate or overestimate the amount that 
takes place. The phenomenon itself often takes 
place in secret, between more or less willing 
partners, who have no interest in revealing that it 
has taken place. Increased levels of prosecution 
may reflect a more effective judicial system, 
rather than changes in the underlying rate of 
corruption (Sampford et al 2006). It is hard to 
disentangle the effects of the anti-corruption 
campaign from other changes taking place 
anyway. It all takes time.  Similar difficulties 
bedevil evaluation of campaigns against other 
kinds of crime, shameful activity, and public 
policy more generally.
International campaigns are doubly hard to 
assess. They are campaigns to persuade other 
governments to campaign against corruption. 
Each step may need a separate evaluation. For 
example, donors may successfully persuade 
the government of country X to adopt an anti-
corruption policy, but that policy goes on to 
fail. 
Here we focus on effectiveness, which is 
of practical interest to the banks and donors 
who sponsor anti-corruption campaigns. They 
want to know if anti-corruption initiatives are 
working, and donors are paying increasing 
attention to aid effectiveness.1
The paper introduces the region, and the 
particular Australian interest in it. Then it 
considers how corruption is defined in the 
region, and by donors. It then identifies 
international dimensions of corruption, and 
international initiatives against it. Then it looks 
at evidence available on the effectiveness of 
such initiatives. Finally it briefly considers the 
relevance of other evaluation criteria.
the pacific islands
The small island states of the Pacific are 
particularly dependent upon the international 
system. Many are what Jackson (1990) 
characterised harshly as ‘quasi states,’ 
sustained by international recognition of their 
governments, and foreign aid, rather than 
domestic capacity and taxation. So - like it 
or not - they are more open to international 
pressure than larger or more self-sufficient 
countries. Island governments club together in 
regional organisations like the Pacific Islands 
Forum (henceforth ‘The Forum’).  They 
also form sub-regional groupings in larger 
organisations like the Asian Development 
Bank, the Commonwealth, or the Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific grouping in relation to 
the EU. During the 1990s these international 
organisations became conduits for policies of 
‘good governance,’ including public sector 
reform, accountability and anti-corruption 
(Larmour 2005).
The Pacific Islands also constitute regions 
of influence for relatively powerful neighbours. 
Australia – also a member of the Forum - 
has decided to become actively and directly 
involved in the government of what it sees as the 
potentially ‘failing’ states of Solomon Islands, 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Dinnen 
2004).  Nauru and PNG had been colonies 
of Australia until they became independent 
in the 1970s (whereas Britain ruled Solomon 
Islands until 1978 and has shown little interest 
in it since).  The Australian Prime Minister 
explained: 
The South Pacific has the enduring 
problems of poverty, bad governance 
and corruption, and what we’re trying 
to do is do something about both. It’s 
in our interests strategically, historically 
and sentimentally. If we just throw up 
our arms and go away, you’ll end up 
with these places being taken over by 
interests that are very hostile to Australia. 
It’s also walking away from our moral 
responsibility. We are far and away the 
most powerful and influential country in 
the whole area, and nobody else will do 
the job if we don’t (The Daily Telegraph 
31 December 2006).
It is possible to compare the 14 states 
listed in Table 1 as each of these have been 
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ideologically indistinct politicians rotate office, 
and its spoils, with one another. 
Each country’s legal system is inherited from 
colonial rule or copied from models circulating 
internationally. Laws are often criticised as 
being out of step with indigenous traditions and 
popular opinion. Politicians sometimes defend 
as ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ behaviour that 
outsiders might regard as corrupt. Thus a PNG 
Prime Minister, criticised for paying money to 
an MP to cross the floor in parliament, replied 
‘corruption is part of our culture’ (Larmour 
1997).  Ethical commitments to family and kin 
may contradict official duties. Traditional gifts 
and payments to chiefs and pastors may be 
hard to distinguish from bribes made to secure 
advantage.  Elections often involve substantial 
public payments by candidates to local leaders, 
and directly to voters. 
Popular opinion often seems to cast the net 
of corruption widely to include the personal 
misbehaviour of elites, and signs of wealth 
such as four wheel drives, and overseas travel. 
Perceptions of corruption are often biased 
against trading minorities like the Indians or 
Chinese who provide the backbone of a local 
private sector in most of the region. As Krastev 
(2002) found in post-communist Balkans, new, 
visible and unwelcome inequalities of income 
are often more easily explained as the result of 
corruption, rather than luck, effort, the market 
or the merit principle. Foreign aid and bribery 
are conceptually similar (Morgenthau 1962) 
and the relatively high salaries of foreign aid 
workers and payments to consultants are often 
spoken about as a form of corruption. 
international understandings 
of corruption
International governmental organisations 
tend to take a more economic view of corruption. 
The World Bank adopted TI’s definition, ‘the 
use of public office for private gain’ (while 
TI has since moved on to a more expansive 
definition ‘the use of entrusted power for 
private gain’). While this definition focuses 
on the acts of individuals, rather than the 
character of a whole system of government, 
international organisations have generally 
shied away from campaigns against particular 
corrupt individuals.  They are not like Interpol, 
coordinating international action against 
subject to detailed independent surveys of what 
Transparency International calls their ‘national 
integrity systems’: the institutions in place 
to control corruption, and their performance 
in practice.  I will examine the international 
dimensions of corruption uncovered in these 
surveys, and the international action being taken 
against it.  The latter includes public sector 
reform promoted by the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the World Bank; an ADB-
OECD anti-corruption initiative; a leadership 
code promoted by the Pacific Islands Forum; 
the creation of local chapters of Transparency 
International; and a crackdown on offshore 
financial centres by the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), an offshoot of the OECD. 
Recently Australia has provided soldiers, 
policemen and other government officials to 
‘strengthen’ institutions in Solomon Islands, 
PNG and Nauru.  The paper then draws some 
conclusions about the effectiveness of these 
international campaigns, and considers other 
ways in which they might be evaluated.
Corruption is famously difficult to define, 
and these difficulties are likely to be great 
in international campaigns that juxtapose 
different legal systems and different popular 
understandings. For example, a recent survey 
in Solomon Islands found  62% of the rural 
population, and 46% of the urban population 
believed the government was corrupt, though 
focus groups found ‘no universal agreement on 
what constituted corruption (and some tendency 
to challenge the conventional Western view of 
it)’ (RAMSI 2006: 2). So first I look briefly at 
how ‘corruption’ is often understood within the 
region, and by international organisations.
domestic understandings of 
corruption
Most Pacific Island countries’ penal codes 
prohibit bribery of officials, and most public 
service regulations prohibit conflicts of interest. 
Papua New Guinea (PNG), Solomon Islands, 
and Vanuatu also have constitutionally mandated 
codes of practice applying to all politicians 
and senior officials - so called ‘Leadership 
Codes’. Tuvalu introduced a leadership code 
in 2006, and Fiji’s 1998 constitution promises 
one. Accusations and counter-accusations of 
‘corruption’ are also part of the normal language 
of politics in the region, as loose coalitions of 
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particular villains.  Nor do they want to act like 
an international court of appeal against local 
acts of corruption. TI decided to avoid chasing 
individuals out of prudence.  Its local members 
would be subject to litigation or violent 
retaliation. Intergovernmental organisations 
prefer prevention to investigation, and approach 
the harsh word ‘corruption’ through the softer 
language of ‘governance’ and ‘accountability’.
international surveYs of 
corruption
Of the 14 countries I am comparing, only 
PNG and Fiji have featured in Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI). The CPI is a poll of polls, based on 
existing surveys, when available, of each 
country by local and foreign businessmen, 
academics and journalists. It treats corruption as 
an attribute of countries rather than individuals. 
In 2006 PNG scored 4 on a scale of 1-10 
(where 10 is ‘highly clean’ and 0 is ‘highly 
corrupt’). TI thus ranked PNG at 130th of the 
163 countries surveyed in that year, tied with 
Burundi, Cambodia, the Congo, Kyrgyzstan 
and Venezuela (Transparency International 
2006).  Fiji wasn’t ranked in 2006, but a year 
earlier got the same score as PNG (4/10). 
So both PNG and Fiji have below average 
reputations for corruption, but no worse than 
many developing countries, which tend to 
cluster at the low end of the rankings. 
TI has also subjected the same 14 countries 
to more detailed qualitative assessments of 
their ‘national integrity systems’ (NIS). A local 
consulting firm surveyed Fiji (Olaks Consulting 
Services 2001). PNG was surveyed by two PNG 
academics (Mellam and Aloi 2003), and the 
remaining 12 small island states were surveyed 
in a project Manu Barcham and I coordinated 
from The Australian National University.  We 
commissioned foreign and local academics or 
retired officials to carry out the surveys, and 
compared the results (Larmour and Barcham 
2006). These NIS surveys provide the basis for 
the accounts of international corruption below.
international dimensions of 
corruption
The median population for the 14 island 
states is about 100,000 (Table 1). In very small 
countries, without natural resources, there is 
often little to sell overseas but the symbols 
and tokens of sovereignty, like stamps, work 
permits, passports, international telephone 
access codes and internet domain names.  Back 
in the 1970s the Philatelic Bureau – selling 
exotic stamps – was looted by the government 
to fund campaign expenses in Cook Islands 
(Crocombe 1974).  There have been scandals 
over the sale of passports to foreigners in 
Tonga, Kiribati and Samoa. Tonga leases out 
its right to put a communications satellite in 
orbit. Tuvalu has tried to lease out the right to 
use its catchy internet domain name suffix ‘.tv’ 
(Ta’afaki 2004). Several countries use their 
sovereignty to run offshore banking regimes 
congenial to companies and individuals wanting 
to avoid tax in their home countries.
Local opportunities for profitable investment 
are small in most of Polynesia and Micronesia. 
Phosphate revenues in Kiribati are placed in a 
portfolio of shares offshore, whereas in Nauru 
ministers have invested directly in offshore 
hotels and an airline.  They have often been 
the victims of scams, or at least poor advice. 
In each of these three cases – passports, tax 
avoidance, and overseas investment – it was 
often not clear if ministers involved were 
benefiting personally, or acting recklessly on 
behalf of the national treasury. 
Often the most valuable thing a small 
country has to sell is its vote in international 
forums, such as the International Whaling 
Commission or the United Nations.  Japan 
has cultivated island governments and their 
officials to support its positions on whaling. 
Governments switch sides between support for 
China and Taiwan. Currently six Pacific Island 
states recognise Taiwan rather than China, and 
they amount to one quarter of the dwindling 
number of states to do so (Dobell 2007: 9). 
The Chinese Premier toured the region in 2006, 
promising preferential loans, trade access, 
training opportunities and debt forgiveness to 
the seven states with which it currently has 
diplomatic relations (Peoples Daily Online 
April 6 2006).  The Premier offered trade as 
well as aid, and did not nag island leaders about 
‘good governance’. Fiji’s 2006 coup leader, 
regretting the sanctions applied by Australia 
and New Zealand, threatened to turn to China 
for support instead.  
Taiwanese government funding has 
contributed to corruption in the Solomon Islands. 
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In 2001 the Taiwanese government loaned the 
Solomon Islands government $US25 million 
to pay compensation to victims of the recent 
ethnic conflict. Its rapid and chaotic distribution 
led to claims of unfairness and extortion, 
and accusations that particular ministers had 
improperly benefited. Taiwan is accused of 
financially supporting candidates in the 2006 
general election, and the subsequent election of 
the Prime Minister (Dobell 2007: 11). Later in 
the year the Taiwanese ambassador in Solomon 
Islands was cheerfully announcing that he 
would be paying $400,000 Solomon Islands 
dollars ($ US49, 000) in ‘Rural Community 
Development Funds’ annually to every MP to 
spend as they wished in their constituencies 
(Maesulia 2006).  
The three largest countries in the region, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Fiji, face the opposite risk, a variety of what 
economists call a ‘resource curse’.  Log exports 
have been a major source of corruption in 
each of these countries. Politicians often act as 
intermediaries between local landowners and 
the foreign, mainly Malaysian and Indonesian, 
loggers. A timber project seems to offer 
traditional landowners in isolated areas access 
to cash, jobs and services that are otherwise 
only available in the capital cities, or abroad. 
The larger-scale mining industry in PNG is 
more centralised, and any corruption that might 
take place more hidden, or of the ‘policy’ 
kind, where interested politicians and officials 
get the law changed in their favour. Mining 
revenues may later be misappropriated in other 
more visible ways.
The region – except Fiji and Nauru - 
depends heavily on foreign aid (Table 1). 
The multilateral banks rely on the recipient 
governments’ accountability structures. Smaller 
amounts at the discretion of ambassadors 
or mobilised for emergency relief, are often 
used or seen as forms political patronage.  In 
Solomon Islands, for example, the first Prime 
Minister resigned over claims that French 
hurricane relief funds were disproportionately 
channeled to his own village. Funding under 
the first Compact of Free Association that the 
US signed with its former colonies became 
so plagued with problems of accountability 
and suspicions of corruption that the revised 
Compact contains provision for a special audit 
office based in Hawai’i.
international initiatives to 
prevent corruption
1. conditionalitY bY the adb and the 
World bank
Fiscal crises in the mid 1990s led six2 
Pacific Island countries to seek loans from 
the Asian Development Bank. The Bank 
used the opportunity to nudge them towards 
‘public sector reform’. Loan conditions 
typically included asset sales, downsizing, 
the introduction of Value Added Tax, and 
output budgeting. Existing heads of department 
were removed; their jobs put on contract, and 
advertised outside the civil service.  Corruption 
was not targeted as such, but new consultation 
and accountability mechanisms were to be 
introduced, such as national summits with the 
private sector and NGOs. In Cook Islands, 
for example, private sector accountants were 
brought on to a new committee to oversee 
government public expenditure. 
Corruption in the forest industry was 
targeted more directly and explicitly in the 
World Bank’s loan negotiations with PNG.  In 
the late 1990s the Bank began to work closely 
with international environmental NGOs (and 
at the same time became friendlier towards 
TI). It pushed to make reform of the logging 
industry a condition of loans proposed for PNG. 
Negotiations broke down, amid accusations 
from PNG that the World Bank was interfering 
with domestic policy.  A change of government 
bought both sides back to the table in 2000. 
The PNG government seemed to agree to new 
loan conditions including a moratorium on new 
forestry agreements and a case by case review 
of the legality of existing ones (Filer 2004).
2.  signing up to the adb-oecd anti-
corruption initiative
The ADB also joined with the OECD to 
invite governments in the wider Asia-Pacific 
region to sign up to an ‘action plan’ against 
corruption. The Plan’s cross-sectoral approach 
reflected the participation of governments, 
organizations representing the private sector 
and selected NGOs (including TI) who attended 
a conference held in Tokyo in 2001. Having 
agreed to the plan, governments were to 
propose three specific projects for review by a 
steering committee (and subsequent funding by 
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donors). So far six3 Pacific Island governments 
have signed up to the initiative, along with 
another 19 Asian countries.  Several have 
proposed projects, such as (in PNG’s case) 
training programs for investigators, support for 
an inter-agency coordinating committee, and a 
public education campaign (http://www1.oecd.
org/daf/asiacom/AP/PNG.htm). 
. peer revieW bY the forum
Early in the 2000s Australia began using 
the Forum to press island states to improve 
their systems of governance, attempting first 
to persuade its members to adopt a ‘leadership 
code’ (a legally binding set of standards of 
behaviour that would apply to politicians 
and senior officials).  The Forum has also 
been promoting ‘peer review’ of countries’ 
success in implementing ‘eight principles of 
accountability’ for which they have jointly 
affirmed support. These do not deal directly 
with corruption, though their adoption might 
make it less likely, or easier to detect.  Several of 
the principles rely on power of a democratically 
elected legislature to oversee the executive and 
the bureaucracy, through approving expenditure 
in an annual budget, approving loans entered 
into by ministers, and considering reports of 
auditors general and ombudsmen. They do not 
address corruption in parliaments themselves, 
an issue identified as problematic in most of 
the NIS studies. The Forum’s Financial and 
Economic ministers have signed up to these 
principles, and are meant to report to each other 
on progress in adopting them.
. franchising ngos 
TI’s founders soon realised that its campaign 
against international corruption would not 
attract popular support unless they also dealt 
with corruption within countries. So they began 
to franchise their name to local anti-corruption 
campaigns. TI’s structure leaves local groups 
– called ‘chapters’ – to fund and fend for 
themselves, simply franchising its name to any 
local group that adopts its standards and policies, 
and sometimes helping with seed money.  A 
PNG group was set up after a political crisis that 
followed the government’s botched attempt to 
hire foreign mercenaries to subdue a provincial 
rebellion (Larmour 2003).  Smaller groups 
have coalesced in Fiji, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu, and TI’s Australian chapter has taken 
a particular interest in their tutelage – including 
(to declare an authorial interest) coordinating 
and funding the 12 country survey of National 
Integrity Systems referred to above.
. cleaning up offshore financial 
centres
In 1989, the Group of Seven rich countries 
set up a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
attempting to persuade the governments that 
sponsor Offshore Financial Centres (OFCs) to 
regulate them more closely. The OECD was 
originally concerned with loss of tax revenues, 
but has shifted its emphasis to money laundering 
defined as ‘the process of converting cash, or 
other property, which is derived from criminal 
activity, so as to give it the appearance of 
having been obtained from a legitimate source’ 
(Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering 
Secretariat 2003).
The FATF first tried to get governments to 
adopt what it called its ‘Forty Recommendations,’ 
which included obligations to criminalise the 
laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes, 
to require financial institutions to be able to 
identify their clients, and to report suspicious 
transactions. Governments were to introduce 
systems to control financial institutions, and 
to enter into agreements allowing international 
cooperation. The Task Force published annual 
lists of ‘non-cooperative’ countries, starting in 
2000.
The US sharply increased its own pressure 
on the OFCs, as part of its counter-terrorist 
activity after September 11 2001. Section 
312 of the Patriot Act required US banks 
to exercise ‘due diligence’ towards risks of 
money laundering in ‘correspondent accounts’ 
that foreign banks might hold with them (US 
Department of Treasury 2005).  A further 
eight, then nine, recommendations were added 
to FATF’s original forty, to deal with the 
implications of the Patriot Act.
Among South Pacific countries, Cook 
Islands, Marshall Islands, Niue and Nauru 
appeared on the first FATF list. Countermeasures 
included warning non-financial businesses 
dealing with listed countries that the transaction 
might run the risk of money laundering.  In 
December 2001, FATF members agreed to 
apply additional countermeasures to Nauru for 
its failure to abolish 400 shell banks, which had 
no physical presence in the country.
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. australian-led action against “state 
failure”
Elements of the Solomon Islands police 
led a coup d’etat in 2000 and forced the 
Prime Minister to resign. Though a civilian 
government stayed in place, and a general 
election was later held, government officials, 
particularly those in the finance department, 
continued to be intimidated by thugs and gangs 
linked to political leaders.  Solomon Islands 
leaders made several requests for Australian 
intervention which were rejected by the 
Australian Foreign Minister on the grounds that 
‘foreigners do not have answers for the deep-
seated problems afflicting Solomon Islands’ 
(quoted in Fullilove 2006: 6). 
Australian policy then shifted, for several 
reasons. The success of Australia’s intervention 
in East Timor in 1999 and its alliance with 
the US in its ‘war on terror’’ seemed to 
embolden the Prime Minister, John Howard. 
These international events happened against a 
steady loss of Australian official faith in more 
traditional approaches to aid and development 
in the region. Economic growth since the 
countries became independent had been slow to 
negative, particularly if measured in per capita 
terms (Table 1).  The International Financial 
Institutions, and bilateral donors like Australia, 
increasingly believed that bad governance – 
particularly corruption - was the reason for low 
levels of growth, and that good governance 
should be addressed in aid programs.  Pacific 
Island governments (demonised as ‘elites’) 
came to be seen as part of the problem as much 
as part of the solution. 
In July 2003 Australia sent over 2,000 
troops, police and other officials in a ‘Regional 
Assistance Mission’ to Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI) to restore law and order and stabilise 
government finances. The mission was framed 
as a Forum initiative, and included small 
contingents of police and soldiers from other 
countries in the region. The intervention was 
invited by the Solomon Islands government, 
and regulated by a special act of the Solomon 
Islands Parliament.  
PNG is the largest country in the region, 
with an estimated population of over 7 million 
(Table 1). It is the largest recipient of Australian 
aid, and Australia is the largest donor to PNG. 
The latter’s low rate of economic growth and 
its law-and-order problems continue to cause 
despair and impatience in Canberra, and PNG’s 
leaders are regularly offended when their 
country appears in Australian lists of potentially 
‘failing’ states. In 2003 Australia devised an 
‘Enhanced Cooperation Programme’ which 
would put several hundred Australian police 
on patrol in PNG, and Australian officials in 
line positions in departments concerned with 
finance and criminal justice, including the 
prosecution of corrupt officials and politicians. 
Nauru – at the opposite extreme of scale, 
with a population of only 10,000 - used to have 
one of the highest per capita incomes of the 
island states, as a consequence of phosphate 
mining. Corruption and mismanagement of 
its offshore investment portfolio and regional 
airline have led to Nauru’s near bankruptcy. 
A new source of sovereignty-based revenue 
became available in 2002 when Australia 
started to pay the Nauru government to act as 
host to an offshore detention centre for illegal 
immigrants to Australia. They could be held 
without the protections of Australian law while 
Australian officials assessed their applications 
for asylum. A similar deal was done with PNG 
over a camp on Manus Island.
effectiveness
1. conditionalitY bY the adb and the 
World bank
The ADB sponsored Public Sector Reforms 
in the 1990s aimed to improve financial 
accountability, and budget control, which would 
thereby reduce opportunities for corruption. 
The NIS studies were not tasked to assess 
the effects of these reforms on corruption, 
and do not provide much incidental evidence. 
However the Samoa report quotes a newspaper 
publisher saying that corruption had decreased 
since the 1990s, but goes out of its way to say it 
found ‘no links’ between the government’s anti-
corruption efforts and donor pressure (So’o et 
al 2004: 27).  
ADB officials were later critical of the 
Bank’s reform activities in the late 1990s. 
They found the reforms complex, alien and 
unsustainable.  Training programs had been 
ineffective, and there had been too much 
use of consultants (Mellor and Jabes 2004: 
56).  The ‘rush to downsize’ governments had 
incidentally weakened the enforcement of rules 
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designed to prevent corruption in procurement 
(ibid: 34). 
 To-ing and fro-ing continued between the 
PNG government and the World Bank over 
the terms of the moratorium on new logging 
agreements, and the review of hundreds of 
existing agreements. Extensions to some permits 
were issued, others threatened with rescission 
(Filer 2004). The World Bank suspended its loan. 
In 2004 a new permit was issued to the largest 
foreign company involved, Rimbunan Hijau. 
The company had become increasingly vocal on 
behalf of logging, through the local newspaper 
it conveniently owned, and by commissioning 
its own consultancy report to counter the welter 
of documentation produced by the World Bank 
and the conservation movement (ITS Global, 
2006).  In 2005 the government and the World 
Bank jointly announced the cancellation of the 
project to finance forestry reform (ibid).
2. signing up to the adb-oecd anti 
corruption initiative
 The Secretariat of the ADB-OECD initiative 
reviewed its progress in 2005/6. But the report 
is made in aggregate rather than country-by-
country, so it is hard to tell how much applies 
to the six Pacific Island members and how 
much to the other 19 countries (ADB-OECD 
2006). None of the Pacific members were cited 
as examples of the more comprehensive and 
holistic approach that the review saw emerging 
in the Asia-Pacific region (ibid: 12).
. peer revieW bY the forum
A ‘stocktake’ of the Forum’s accountability 
process found agreements made at the 
Forum were not being well communicated 
and implemented back home (Pacific Islands 
Forum Secretariat, 2002).  Another stocktake 
two years later found some changes, mainly to 
legislation, but only among the seven countries 
which replied to the questionnaire. The 
main constraints were lack of political will, 
technical capacity and human resources (ibid: 
2004). Island ministers rejected the lengthy 
draft leadership code proposed by Australian 
consultants, and instead adopted a shorter set 
of ‘principles of good leadership’. However 
Tuvalu went on to pass its own leadership code 
legislation in 2006, which was based on the 
Forum model (Ta’afaki 2004: 10). The Forum 
reported that Nauru, Kiribati and Marshall 
islands were preparing similar legislation 
(Somare 2005).
. franchising ngos
Five years after its inception, TI (PNG) 
conducted a review of its own effectiveness. 
Its chairman found some success in the 
development of school curricula and awareness 
raising. But he reported less success with 
attempts to promote Integrity Pledges among 
election candidates, and Integrity Pacts amongst 
companies bidding for tenders. TI’s campaign 
to establish an ICAC had fallen on deaf ears in 
parliament (Siaguru 2001).
. cleaning up ofcs
The threat of commercial isolation has 
brought about legal changes in OFCs. Nauru 
held out longest but by 2006 it had legislated 
sufficiently for the FATF to remove it from its 
blacklist.
. australian-led action against “state 
failure”
RAMSI quickly restored law and order in 
Solomon Islands in 2003 and has turned its 
attention to supporting institutions involved 
with finance, accountability, and criminal 
justice. According to RAMSI’s website 3,600 
guns were given up. Six thousand, three hundred 
people have been arrested – roughly 1 adult in 
50.4 One hundred and sixty Solomon Islands 
policemen now face corruption and other 
serious charges brought under local legislation. 
Six former ministers have been charged with 
corruption. Government finances have been 
stabilized, with economic growth running at 
5% per annum (after a fall of 25% through the 
conflict).  Audit reports are once again being 
presented to parliament (Wasuka 2006).5 
However, relations between the Solomons 
and Australian governments soured after a 
riot following the election of a new Prime 
Minister in April 2006 (Moore 2006). There 
were sharp public disagreements about 
a proposed commission of enquiry into 
the riot, about the appointment of a new 
attorney general, and about the rearming of the 
Solomon Islands police.  Early in 2007 Foreign 
Minister Downer published an ‘open letter’ in 
a Solomons newspaper defending RAMSI’s 
achievements and warning of a ‘deliberate 
push to undermine’ it. Prime Minister Sogavare 
responded saying Australia was trying to run 
a ‘parallel government’ in Solomon Islands 
(AAP 7 February 9 2007).
 evaluating international action against corruption in the pacific islands

Meanwhile, the ECP was implemented in 
PNG in late 2004, after a year of negotiations 
over the immunities from local legislation that its 
Australian officials might enjoy.  One hundred 
Australian police were briefly on patrol in the 
capital and Bougainville, and 45 Australian 
officials in position in PNG government 
departments. The ECP programme was halted 
in May 2005 after PNG’s Supreme Court found 
that immunities against prosecution promised 
to Australian officials were unconstitutional, 
but the non-police officials have remained in 
‘advisory’ rather than ‘line’ positions.
conclusions about 
effectiveness
In five of these six cases international 
organizations tried to persuade island 
governments to change their policies, by 
different means, with varying degrees of 
success.  At least two steps were involved, 
and each might succeed or fail.  First, the 
international organization had to persuade 
the island government to adopt the new 
policy. Second, the island government had to 
implement it. It might fail the second step for 
all sorts of reasons, such as lack of political 
commitment, resistance among those affected, 
under-resourcing or because it was a bad idea 
in the first place. Reforms often seemed to stick 
half way – the government agreed, maybe even 
a law was passed, but nothing happened on the 
ground. 
Among these five cases, the ADB’s public 
sector reforms were adopted and partly 
implemented (though the Bank now feels they 
were not such a good idea in the first place). 
The World Bank’s proposals for forestry reform 
in PNG, by contrast, never got to the stage of 
being adopted, let alone implemented.
The ADB-OECD and Forum initiatives 
were focused on the adoption of presumably 
correct policies, rather than their effectiveness 
once implemented. The Forum’s later stocktake 
pointed to the gap between what ministers 
agreed to at conferences, and what happened 
when they went home.   Tuvalu actually 
passed a law, but it is too soon to tell if a 
leadership code will in fact have any impact on 
corruption.
TI tries to influence governments directly, 
but its awareness and education campaigns are 
more indirect and bottom-up.  They are meant 
to get around the reluctance or incapacity of 
governments to adopt and implement anti-
corruption policies. They hope that a more 
educated and aware population will put 
pressure on the government to reform. The 
bottom-up approach is also forced to confront 
the difficulty, discussed at the start of this 
paper, that popular conceptions of what counts 
as ‘corruption’ may differ from conceptions 
held by foreigners, the law, or the local elite. 
The people may be complicit beneficiaries of 
some forms of corruption, such as vote buying. 
However, it may be more effective than direct 
approaches, but over a longer term.
The FATF has it comparatively easy.  It 
targets the international dimensions of 
corruption through international measures. 
Legal changes are probably sufficient, as it is 
the peculiarities of local legislation that provide 
the niche in which OFCs prosper.  Without 
local enabling legislation, they should simply 
wither on the vine.
RAMSI is different from these two-
step forms of international intervention. It 
implements anti-corruption policies directly, in 
country, in parallel with the Solomon Islands 
government. RAMSI and Solomon Islands 
officials often work side by side, rather than the 
former merely advising the latter.  And the laws 
RAMSI implements are already in place, rather 
than transferred. RAMSI’s job was to get them 
working again, though it has subsequently gone 
on to consider how they might be reformed.
RAMSI has been highly effective in the 
short term. Yet its goals have shifted since its 
inception, and it has given itself a long time 
to achieve them. Its website tells us in 2007 
that its goal is to make a ‘peaceful, well-
governed and prosperous Solomon Islands’. 
It is a work-in-progress but is vulnerable to 
‘mission creep,’ taking on new tasks while the 
old ones falter. Evaluation may easily become 
a circular process of adjusting goals to current 
activities. In some ways effectiveness is the 
least of its problems.
other criteria for evaluation
This paper has focused for practical reasons 
on effectiveness but, as we saw at the start, 
there are many other criteria to evaluate policy 
against.  Earlier we introduced the standard 
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criteria of economy, efficiency, and equity. 
To take one example among these, Michael 
Fullilove has argued that Australia’s dominant 
role makes RAMSI more efficient than typical 
UN interventions, with their problems of 
coordination (2006: 12-13, 2007: 1).  He also 
suggests two other important criteria:  popularity 
and sustainability (2006: 10).  RAMSI’s 
popularity with ordinary Solomon Islanders 
was attested to by an independent review by an 
Eminent Persons Group appointed by the Forum 
(Pacific Islands Forum 2005). Yet it may be, as 
suggested above from the evidence of RAMSI’s 
own survey, that popular opinion understands 
‘corruption’ differently from RAMSI, and so 
may judge its performance differently too. 
Fullilove worries about its sustainability, and 
RAMSI’s own research finds that 65% of the 
population thought that violence would return 
if RAMSI left (RAMSI 2006: 2).  
Recent public disagreements between the 
Australian and Solomon Islands governments 
show how vulnerable RAMSI is to loss of 
political support in Canberra and Honiara. 
Table 2 tries to summarise these multiple 
criteria for evaluation in terms of the questions 
they ask. There is little doubt that RAMSI has 
been effective in achieving its goals in the short 
term. Filling in the other scores is a matter for 
future discussion and research. 
Population 
(2004, 
estimated)
GNP per 
capita $US 
Purchasing 
Power Parity 
(2000)
Average 
annual 
growth of 
GNP per 
capita 1970-
2000
Average 
annual aid per 
capita since 
1970 ($US)
Aid as % of 
GDP
Papua New 
Guinea 7,236,000 2180 0.3 104 7
Fiji 891,100 4480 2.7 65 2
Solomon 
Islands 589,700 1710 -0.4 110 20
Vanuatu 289,400 2960 -0.3 217 14
Somoa 182,700 5050 0.8 213 14
Kiribati 166,100 950 -1.2 217 33
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia
112,700 2000 na 178 50
Tonga 98,300 1660 2.6 233 15
Marshall 
Islands 55,400 1600 na 232 61
Palau 20,700 9000 na 933 27
Cook Islands 14,000 5000 na 646 na
Nauru 10,100 5000 na 51 na
Tuvalu 9,600 1100 -1.4 647 na
Niue 1,600 3800 na 3558 na
Sources: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2005; Chand, 2003
Table 1
Pacific Islands Population, GNP Growth and Aid
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Potential Criteria for Evaluating RAMSI
Criterion Score Questions to Consider
Economy Was RAMSI designed to be as cheap as possible? Was it wasteful or profligate in its use of staff and money?
Efficiency 
(technical)
Was maximum benefit derived from the resources committed to 
RAMSI? Could the same have been achieved for less?
Efficiency 
(allocative)
Could the staff, money and political attention devoted to RAMSI 
have been better spent on other kinds of aid to Solomon Islands, or 
in other countries? Or on other Australian government activities?
Effectiveness High in short term
What outcomes were specified? How were they measured? Over 
what periods? Were they achieved? Is Solomon Islands now ‘peace-
ful, well-governed and prosperous’ and is Australia more secure? 
Were there any unintended outcomes, positive or negative?
Equity 
(process)
Was force used consistently with international and domestic law? 
Were regional arrangements respected? Were the rights of those 
accused respected? Was there bias against one side or the other in 
the ethnic conflict? Were people humiliated and abused? How did 
women children and minorities fare? How far did RAMSI respect the 
sovereignty of Solomon Islands government?
Equity 
(outcomes)
Were the big fish eventually caught? Were all corrupt officials in fact 
prosecuted? Were resources in Solomon Islands distributed more 
fairly after RAMSI, or were new inequalities introduced? How far did 
RAMSI achieve the ‘good’ in good governance?
Popularity
How popular has RAMSI been in Solomon Islands and Australia? 
Which aspects have been more or less popular?  Have there been 
differences between regions, and between elite and public opinion? 
How has it been treated in local and Australian media, and in third 
countries? How successful has it been in communicating its aims 
and achievements, and in responding to complaints.
Sustainability
What are the chances of the changes introduced by RAMSI surviving 
its leaving? What forces and tendencies in Solomon Islands politics 
will tend to undermine or sustain it? What trends in the demogra-
phy, economy and society of Solomon Islands will tend to sustain or 
undermine its effects?
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endnotes 
1 This paper is intended as an output of an Australia 
Research Council ‘linkage’ project with AusAID 
on aid effectiveness in the Pacific. The project is 
being carried out with Satish Chand, Ben Reilly, 
Scott Flower and Aaron Batten at the ANU. I am 
grateful for comments from Clive Moore, Barry 
Hindess, Anthony Regan and several anonymous 
reviewers, while I remain responsible for the 
content. An earlier version, focusing more on 
policy transfer, is published in the Asian Journal 
of Political Science Vol 15 No 1 April 2007.  The 
paper was completed while I was visiting the 
Pacific Islands Development Program at the East 
West Center in Honolulu, and I would also like to 
thank Dr Geoff White and Dr Jerry Finin and his 
staff for their kind support.
2 Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu. See Larmour 2005 (pp. 87-106).
3 Cook Islands, Fiji, Palau, PNG, Samoa and 
Vanuatu.
4 The population between 15-64 amounts to 53% 
of the total (http://www.spc.int/popadvocacy/
COUNTRY%20PROFILE-5.SVP.htm).
5 One of these reporting that an Australian 
government corporation, Air Services Australia, 
had been involved in the corruption that RAMSI 
was sent to clean up. The corporation had held the 
contract to manage Solomon Islands airspace, and 
had collected revenue from international airlines 
on behalf of Solomon Islands.  Apparently $2.2 
million of this revenue had been diverted ‘to third 
parties, at the direction of senior Solomon Islands 
officials’ (Air Services Australia 2006).
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